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THE PRIVATE FAMILY FOUNDATION:
CAUSA MORTIS
WILLIAM J. LEHRFELD*
The foundation is a phenomenon which has 'come of age'
since 1950. There was a time when a man's status in his com-
munity was determined by the number of cars in his garage.
Now, his position in the community is based on the number
of foundations under his wing. . . . The general public has
only, in the past two years, become aware of what is actually
taking place. . . . I predict that an informed public will make
tax exempt foundations one of the most important issues of
our time.'
If tax laws were graven on stone tablets, Rule One would deal
with form and substance, and would warn of the peril in neglecting
one for the other. Often transactions or events are designed by tax-
payers to meet the form prescribed for tax minimization, but, unless
substance is also contained, the planned tax consequences may not
materialize. A frequent government challenge to minimization or
avoidance techniques of taxpayers is that the real or first purpose of
a plan does not coincide with its projected form.' Thus taxation, to
give effect to reality, must exalt substance over forma Congress,
however, sometimes indulges, as do taxpayers, in exalting form over
substance for its own purposes. Although tax bills have the form which
suggests they are revenue-raising measures, and their substantive
complexity is frequently commensurate with the increasing complexity
of our society, in a trompe l'oeil tax laws are also used by the Congress
to accomplish economic, social, penal, and sometimes political goals,
which are important exceptions to the revenue-raising function. For
example, the provisions dealing with enactment, suspension, restoration
and repeal of the investment credit accomplished the needed economic
goals;A the provision giving credit for state unemployment tax against
federal unemployment tax' accomplishes important social goals; the
* B.S., Lehigh University, 1958; LL.B., Catholic University of America, 1965; Vice-
Chairman, Committee on Exempt Organizations, Section of Taxation, American Bar
Association; Member of the firm of Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington,
D.C.
1 Hearings Pursuant to H.R. Res. 13 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the Select Comm.
on Small Business, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964) (remarks of Representative Patman).
2 Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
• National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
4 Tht, Rev. Code of 1954, §{ 38-49.
5
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, II 3302.
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excise taxes on marijuana° and alcohol' demonstrate penal goals; and,
apart from the new foundation provisions, the treatment of segregated
schools in the South under the exemption and contribution provisions
satisfies political goals.° Both political and penal goals were involved in
the reformation of controls over foundations, and these provisions,
including the new Chapter 42 of the (nternal Revenue Code, are the
most complex tax legislation with non-tax or non-revenue motivation
ever enacted.
Periodically, particular foundations,° or foundations as a class,
have been the object of congressional concern. More often than not,
the desire for rectification of alleged abuses was satisfied administra-
tively, with exemption rulings being challenged or public statements
being made to curb transactions." In the case of small foundations,
revocation of exemption generally ended the issue since the amounts
involved were relatively small and the costs in submitting the case to
judicial review were far greater than any possible benefits. This ad-
ministrative rectification route presumed that the Internal Revenue
Service was willing and able to mak e the effort to oversee exempt
organizations. However, it has been suggested by one prominent
member of Congress that the Internal Revenue Service's effort in con-
trolling or scrutinizing foundations ms completely inadequate. 11
In 1968, the Congress required, to the extent possible, the Execu-
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 4741-776.
7
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 5001-692.
IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, 1970 C C.H. Std. Fed. Tax Rptr. § 6790.
0 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 509(a) defines "private foundation."
20
 In recent weeks, the Jerry Rubin Fund was declared tax exempt to the dismay
of some Congressmen. The IRS promised to rimiew its ruling. See Washington Post,
Sept. 4, 1970, at A-3. Better evidence of larger administrative action against a class of
foundations was the wholesale IRS investiga tio of the Americans Building Constitu-
tionally plan for converting doctors' and dentist' practices into tax exempt foundations.
Hearings on Tax Exempt Foundations and Their Impact on Small Business Before
Subcomm. of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 235, 262-66
(1968) (remarks of IRS Commissioner Cohen).
11 Representative Patman has roundly a iticized IRS efforts in watchdogging
foundations and other exempt organizations: "Our findings show that the Internal
Revenue Service Record—in terms of supervish n of foundations—is a dud, a dismal
failure." Hearings on Tax Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts Before the House
Comm. on Small Business, 88th Cong., 2nd Seas., at ix (1963) (remarks of Representa-
tive Patman). For a complete survey of Mr. Pa tman's reports and activities, see Hear-
ings on Tax Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy,
Chairman's Report to the Select Comm. on Small Business, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962);
Subcomm. Chairman's Report to Subcomm. No. 2d inst. 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963);
3rd inst., 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964); 4th in;t., 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966) ; 5th
inst., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 6th inst., 91 rth Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968); 7th inst.,
91st Cong., 1st Sess, (1969); see also Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 on Foundations,
Select Comm. on Small Business, 88th Cong., 2nil Sess. (1964), n. 1, as continued, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See also Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform, Before the
Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sas., pt. 1, at 12-78 (1969).
432
THE PRIVATE FAMILY FOUNDATION
tive Department to provide detailed proposals for tax reform." The
Treasury Department of the Johnson Administration turned over its
work product to the Treasury Department of the Nixon Administra-
tion, which released such items on February 5, 1969." Shortly there-
after, hearings on that subject by the House Ways and Means
Committee were begun. In the forefront for reform were private
foundations and taxation of unrelated business income. As a strictly
revenue matter, neither of these prospective reforms were significant.
As is the case in many areas of alleged abuse of the revenue laws by
exempt organizations, the actual dollar loss is either conjectural or so
modest, in relation to other important tax problems, as to cause one.
to wonder over the magnitude of concern generated."
The full effect of the Tax Reform Act's changes can be analyzed
in the three important aspects of foundation life. Phase One is the
funding of the foundation, that is, the means by which it obtains its
support from the donors, or the method by which it earns income to
carry out its exempt function. Phase Two deals principally with the
donor involvement conduct of its financial and related affairs includ-
ing, in this sense, its investment program. Phase Three deals with the
administrative or housekeeping responsibilities which generally attend
the maintenance of this type of entity. This article will try to pull
together the major changes made in the Internal Revenue Code
affecting each of these three phases of the life of the smaller founda-
tions, and how, taken individually or collectively, these changes
signal the decline and eventual demise of the private family founda-
tion."
It is appropriate to focus on the smaller foundations since they
represent the bulk of the foundations extant. The Treasury Depart-
ment believes there are approximately 22,000 private foundations
12
 P.L. 91-172, 91st Cong., 1st Sees. (1969).
Is Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 5047 (1969).
14 The revenue estimates as to "Foundations" appear to be based solely on the
investment income tax and not on any other tax imposed by new Ch. 42 of the Int.
Rev. Code. See generally 113 Cong. Rec. 13041-3048 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 1969). As
originally proposed by the House, the foundation income tax was to yield from $65
million (1970) to $100 million (1979), H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, 160 (1969); as modified by the Senate Finance Comm., $40 million (1970) to $55
million (1979), S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969); as further modi-
fied by the Senate, $20 million (1970) to $30 million (1979), 113 Cong. Rec. 16056-6059
(daily ed. Dec. 8, 1969); and as agreed to in conference, $35 million (1970) to $55
million (1979), 113 Cong. Rec. 13044 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 1969).
12 Had the Senate Finance Comm. prevailed, foundations would only be entitled
to live forty years. Compare S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 25-27 with 113
Cong. Rec. 15729-5737 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1969) and 113 Cong. Rec. 15753-5760 (daily
ed. Dec. 5, 1969).
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whose assets approximate 20 billion dollars in market value."' One
congressional study based on 1967 computations showed that 647
foundations (and not the 647 largest foundations) had approximately
$17.8 billion in assets.' 7 Thus, about $2.2 billion was left for approxi-
mately 21,300 foundations, or an average of $100,000 in assets. Other
sources show approximately 6,800 foundations with assets of over
$200,000, .of which the 236 largest had a market value of assets
approximating $15 billion.18 Thus, if 647 foundations had assets of
$17.8 billion, there would be about 6,150 foundations with more.than
$200,000 in assets, or a total of at least:V.2 billion. Combining both
asset figures, you may have no more than $1 billion left for 15,000
foundations, or an average of less than $70,000 per foundation.
Although these are rather rough estimates, one can surmise that the
principal impact of the new provisions will fall upon family foundations
which probably are so small in size that only part-time management is
available to conduct their affairs.
I. PHASE ONE—FUNDING AND DEDUCTIONS
The combined effect, in the case of charitable gifts of
appreciated property, of not taxing the appreciation and at
the same time allowing a charitable contributions deduction
for the appreciation is to produce tax benefits significantly
greater than those available with respect to cash contribu-
tions. . . . In some cases it actually is possible for a taxpayer
to realize a greater after-tax profit by making a gift of
appreciated property than by selling the property, paying the
tax on the gain, and keeping the proceeds. 18
A. Charitable Contributions
The combination of factors which stifle the creation of new
foundations and the continuation of existing smaller foundations
should begin with the limitations on inter vivos giving::The inducement
for creating or maintaining a family foundation was to obtain a tax
benefit for gifts of various classes of property (including stock or
other securities) at appropriate times, thereby minimizing the . burden
of federal income or estate tax upon the donor and his family; Ap-
preciated property, either securities or personal property, could be
16
 Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 709 [hereinafter cited as Senate Tax Reform Act Hearings].
17
 Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., app. I to pt. 1, at 5693 (1969).
18 Calkins, The Role of Philanthropic Foundations, 11 J. of Philanthropic Founda-
tions 5 (1969) citing J. Lewis, The Foundation Directory (3rd ed. 1967).
19
 H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 53 (1969).
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disposed of by gifts to one's newly created foundation during a high-
income year. Low-basis, high-value securities, works of art, auto-
mobiles, boats, miscellaneous remainder interests in property, and
other deductible tangibles or intangibles could be used to create a
fund for the purported public weal with little real dislocation of a
donor's income or asset status.
The Tax Reform Act limits the charitable deductions available
for contributions of property, whether or not given to a foundation,
and consequently checks many of the more blatant abuses in founda-
tion giving. At the outset, a deduction is no longer available for the
value of appreciation inherent in ordinary income property." If an
individual or corporation decides to donate inventory to any charity,
the deduction available to the donor is the property's basis since the
value of the gift is reduced by the amount of gain which would not
have been long-term capital gain had the property been sold by the
taxpayer at its fair value. Under prior law," the allowance of a
deduction for appreciation in ordinary income property, particularly
in the case of business inventory, was of much benefit to business
corporations or proprietors in control of foundations. Although the
inventory of a business seemed an unlikely asset for a foundation or
for any charity, it was a fruitful technique used by planners where the
inventory had substantially appreciated in value over its cost, For
example, a stockbroker, holding short-term securities in a rising
market, was able to minimize his personal tax burden by dropping
these securities into his foundation near the end of the year. A typical
supplementary technique would be to have a buy-back arrangement
for a unilaterally contrived price, and to trade in or out of the various
securities to the broker's benefit. The mere availability of the founda-
tion as a donee, through immediate control by the donor, assured that
the stock would be taken regardless of time (e.g., December 31),
amount or character of the investment. In the instance of the com-
pany-controlled foundation, inventory or fully depreciated property,
such as office machines, typewriters and similar equipment could find
a ready donee which would compliantly accept such goods and assure
a contribution deduction, after reduction for depreciation taken. •
In totality of effect, ordinary income property contributions, for
the high-bracket taxpayer, frequently had the effect of providing such
a person a greater benefit through a "contribution" than would be
achieved had the property been sold and the proceeds retained. For
example, if a taxpayer in the 70 percent marginal 'rate bracket 22 sells
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(e).
21 Prior to amendment, § 170(a) of Int. Rev. Code of 1954 allowed "any chari-
table deduction."
22
 The marginal rate is the amount paid on the last dollar of adjusted gross
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section 306 stock" worth $100 (basis $50), the net effect gives him $65
($50 profit X 70% rate = $35 tax). Upon making a complete gift to
his foundation, thereby keeping a measure of control over the stock,
the individual saves himself $70 in taxes, since he is allowed a $100
deduction off the top of the income. This is an amount which returns
his basis, $50, the net profit after any sale, $15, plus an additional $5.
The Internal Revenue Service sought to curb this obvious bonus in
foundation giving by attacking the exempt status of the foundation-
purchaser-donee, but without success." By presently limiting the de-
ductibility of ordinary income property to a taxpayer's basis, many of
the marginal foundations will lose a source of support since there is
no incentive to donate ordinary income property through this tech-
nique.25
 A bargain sale to the foundation at the taxpayer's basis (sales
price equals basis) magnified the saving by providing him with $85
in hand, as contrasted with $65 had the property been sold. The $50
derived from a bargain sale plus the $35 tax savings from the $50
contribution ($50 X 70% rate) provides this realization. Under prior
Iaw, the seller-donor was allowed to treat his entire basis as allocated
to the sale portion of the sale-gift." If his selling price was equal to
his basis, there was no taxable income. Today, under section 1011(b),27
basis is allocated to the sale at the ratio which the amount realized
(selling price) bears to the fair value of the property. Thus, if the
donor sold a capital asset worth $100 (basis of $50) for $50 to his
foundation, only 50 percent of the basis of the property would be
allocated to•the sale. This would mean he has income of $25 subject
to a capital gains tax. In prior years, the sale-gift would have been tax
free so long as the selling price was equal to or below basis. This new
income. The effective rate, on the other hand, is the percentage of all income paid in
taxes.
23
 Section 306 stock is stock issued as a dividend to a shareholder, and if any
part of such dividend was not included in the distributee's gross income, the general
rule treats the amount realized as ordinary income rather than capital gain to the
selling shareholder. The provision was enacted to thwart shareholders who were attempt-
ing to bail out ordinary income from their corporations at capital gain rates by declar-
ing stack dividends and then selling or redeeming the stock. Cf. Chamberlin v.
Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954). See
generally B. Bittker and J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders 326-37 (2d ed. 1967).
24
 William Waller, 39 T.C. 756 (1963), acq., 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 5.
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(e)(1)(A).
26
 Prior to the 1969 Tax Reform Act, bargain sales to charity were allowed under
Treas. Reg. 1.1001-1(e) (1957).
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1011(b),
Bargain Sale to a Charitable Organization—If a deduction is allowed under
I 170 (relating to charitable contributions) by reason of a sale, then the
adjusted basis for determining the gain from such sale shall be that portion of
the adjusted basis which bears the same ratio to the adjusted basis as the
amount realized bears to the fair market value of the property.
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provision applies to any sale to a charitable organization including
foundations where a contribution would be allowable. It was regarded
as such a valuable donative technique that the Senate deleted the pro-
visions during its consideration of the tax reform bill, but the provision
was restored in conference. 28
Most family foundations are regarded as "feeders" with no
actual charitable functions." Since they were not directly performing a
charitable function, little use could be made of assets which were not
income producing unless such assets were sold and the proceeds dis-
tributed. However, for personal property in the hands of taxpayers,
other than intangible property, the foundation represented a vehicle
for the quiet repose and protection of such property with attendent
financial benefits through deductions. In many cases, no real benefit
was provided any functioning charity, and the true beneficiary was the
donor rather than the donee. Exploiting these areas of imaginative
giving was fairly routine, and government investigators seemed con-
cerned only in those cases where the property of the foundation con-
tinued to be used by the donor. Although the Service argued that
personal use of the contributed property was contrary to the basis for
exemption or was a prohibited transaction under section 503," the
deductibility of the value of such property remained unaffected." If
use of the asset occurred in a year subsequent to the year of the con-
tribution, then there would be no adverse effect upon deductibility in
the year of the contribution. However, under the new law," the
amount of any deduction for tangible property contributed to a founda-
tion is reduced by 50 percent (62-Y2 % in the case of a corporation)
of the amount of gain which would have been long-term capital gain
had the property been sold by the donor, if the use of such property
by the donee is unrelated to the purpose or function constituting the
basis for its exemption. Since the ordinary family foundation has no
operational function, it will be rather difficult for a donor to establish
that a painting, boat or car which he wants to give to his foundation
has a use which relates to the function of the foundation.
If an item of tangible personal property has substantially appre-
28 Compare S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 471 (1969) with H.R. Rep.
No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1969).
28 This term is also used in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 4 502 to describe organizations
which are operated at a profit but which pay all such profits to tax exempt organiza-
tions.
80 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, I 503, prior to amendment, provided generally for loss
of the charitable exemption if the organization engaged in certain prohibited trans-
actions. These prohibited transactions were expanded by the Tax Reform Act.
81 Rev. RuI. 67-149, 1967-1 Cum. Bull. 133, superceding LT. 1945, III-I Cum.
Bull. 273 (1924).
82 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,	 170(e)(1)(B)(i).
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ciated, and if the deduction is an important part of the prospective
donor's tax planning, the worry over allowance of the full deduction
will have a deterrent effect on the prospect of such contributions to
family foundations. To give a work of art to an art museum seemingly
assures a full deduction, except for the problem of valuation," so that
this type of property will end up with operating charities rather than
private foundations. Even if the donor planned on having the founda-
tion sell such property as a fund raising device, part of the deduction is
lost."
B. Ford Reorganization
Death now seems to be a significant consideration in planning for
a foundation endowment. In prior years, a donor could contribute
stock in his family enterprise with the assurance of a full deduction
for the value of the amount contributed," knowing that over the
years he would be able to build up a sizeable monument under his
name in his foundation. One of these types of transactions which
several Tax Reform Act provisions affect is the so-called Ford re-
organization. In this tax planning technique, a business enterprise is
reorganized to provide a substantial amount of non-voting common or
preferred stock to the shareholders who controlled the corporation
prior to its reorganization. Putatively, the non-voting stock would rep-
resent more than half of the value of the business corporation, with
the common voting stock representing the remaining value of the
company. After the reorganization, the individuals in control of the
corporation remain in control, but, in addition, they have the non-
voting stock available to them for their use and disposition. Thus, as a
lifetime planning tool and as an estate plannng tool, non-voting stock
could be used to minimize the income or estate tax burden of the
individuals in control of the corporation. This would be done, of
course, by a contribution of the non-voting stock to a family founda-
tion either over a period of years or at death, or both. If the contribu-
tion is made at death, it substantially reduces the federal estate tax
burden on the owner of the corporation because a major portion of
the value of his company would be going to charity. By direction of
the gift through non-voting stock, the estate would receive a deduction
for the "value" of the stock, and the decedent's heirs would continue
to control the business enterprise, operated in the same fashion as
before, and derive their benefits through the payment of salaries and
88
 For the conditions needed in deducting an art gift see Rev. Rule 57-293, 1957-2
Cum. Bull. 153.
84
 113 Cong. Rec. 13038 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 1969).
85
 Of course the amount of contribution per year would be subject to the per-
centage limitation in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 0 170(b).
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other forms of compensation. By contributing the shares to a private
family foundation, the shares are never out of the sight or control of
the individuals in control of the company: It may never be necessary,
therefore, to redeem such shares or otherwise deplete the resources of
the company, and control over the company remains intact."
The government had been unable or unwilling to attack this fund-
ing device administratively. The existence of an unproductive asset,
including shares of non-voting stock, never seemed to vitiate the
exempt purpose or function of the family foundation. The only means
attempted by the government to frustrate this transaction was to
allege that the stock contributed had no value, but this line of attack
was not upheld by the courts!".
The Tax Reform Act attacked this technique whether accomplished
by gifts or bequests. At the inter.vivos stage, the creation of an endow-
ment in a family foundation through the use of company stock is
almost prohibitive unless the desire! for endowment overcomes the
desire for tax deduction, a rather unlikely event. If a lifetime donor
of appreciated property desires to have his foundation 'retain the
securities as a form of endowment beyond the 15th day of the third
month after the close of the year in which the gift is received, the
donor will lose 50 percent of the amount of his deduction which would
have represented long-term capital gain had the property been sold."
If the donor was a corporation, for example, contributing stock of a
subsidiary to a company foundation,. then the reduction • in the con-
tribution would be 62-Y2 percent of the potential long-term capital
gain. The effect of this provision is, in the case of stock in the family
business, that a donor desirous of an endowment, but more desirous of
a deduction, would be required to spend 100 percent of the value of
the contribution within 75 days after the close of the year in which
the property was contributed in order to receive the full deduction.
Because of this limitation on the extent of any deduction for the
appreciation element in property contributions, a private foundation
will not be the recipient of property, such as securities, unless the
donor decides to accept the penalty of losing one-half the amount of
the deduction attributable to the appreciation. This is a severe price to
pay for any contribution, and it is submitted that few families will be
willing or able to pay for the privilege of creating a foundation endow-
ment.
The provision on limiting the extent of a deduction for a charitable
contribution of appreciated property to a foundation does not apply
88 S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1969).
87
 Henry Pullman, T.C. Memo 1964-218.
88
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(e)(1)(B)(11). '
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where the contribution was made by a decedent. The full value of the
appreciation inherent in such property is deductible in computing the
federal estate tax." There is no requirement that, to obtain the
deduction, a private foundation pay out the appreciated property
within a specified period of time to enable the estate to receive a full
deduction. In this sense then, some donors will be able to fund large
foundations by making contributions of stock in their business enter-
prise which could not have been done due to the inter vivos limitations
on giving. Control of the family enterprise through the foundation is
disrupted, however, by a new provision in Chapter 42 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Under section 4943,40 a private foundation can be taxed on an
amount in any taxable year equal to 5 percent of the value of its "excess
business holdings." The term "excess business holdings" means hold-
ings of a private foundation in a business enterprise which are in excess
of the "permitted holdings."' The term "permitted holdings" means
20 percent of the voting stock of a business enterprise reduced by the
percentage of voting stock owned by all disqualified persons." The
allowable percentage of aggregate holdings for the foundation and all
disqualified persons may reach 35 percent where it can be proved that
a third person has effective control over the business enterprise." This
provision thus treats all non-voting stock as excess holdings except
where all disqualified persons do not own more than 20 percent of the
voting stock of that same business. Thus, in the example cited above,
where the family retained all of the voting stock, none of the preferred
stock would represent a permitted holding for a private foundation."
If a decedent contributes securities in his family business to a private
foundation, and the family directly or indirectly owns more than the
permissible 20 percent, the foundation would be treated as having
excess business holdings upon receipt of the voting stock, presuming,
of course, that some third party does not have effective control of the
business. Thus, in those instances of bequests of voting stock or non-
voting stock in a business which would be treated as excess business
holdings, the foundation has only five years to dispose of the bequest
tax free to other than the family." Sale to persons outside the family,
39 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2055.
40 int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4943.
41 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4943(c).
42 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4943(c) (2) (A). The term "disqualified person" gener-
ally means the foundation managers, substantial contributors to the foundation, cor-
porations, trusts, partnerships, etc., in which they have a specified interest, and all
family members except brothers and sisters.
43 ha. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4943(c) (2)(B).
44 H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1969).
43 As noted infra, disqualified persons may not engage In any transaction such as
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therefore, means it will eventually lose control of the business if the
stock is given to the family foundation.
If the private foundation fails to dispose of the stock of the family
business within the five-year period prescribed by the statute, it
becomes taxable on the value of the stock. The initial tax on the excess
holdings is 5 percent per year." If the family and the managers of the
foundation feel that they can hold on to the stock for several years and
pay the 5 percent tax, the statute provides that the Internal Revenue
Service can impose an additional tax of 200 percent of the value of the
excess business holdings upon the foundation.'" Likewise, under a
special penalty provision for a "flagrant" act of, for example, retaining
these holdings, the 5 percent or the 200 percent tax could be increased
by the imposition of a special 100 percent penalty."
It seems unlikely that a businessman would contribute stock in his
business to his family foundation knowing that the foundation will be
required to dispose of that property within five years to persons other
than members of his family or the business itself. Although section
4943 does not specifically impose this limitation on dispositions, the
transaction would be treated as a self-dealing act between the family
member who purchased the stock and the foundation, thereby person-
ally subjecting the family member to tax on the transaction. This
problem is more fully discussed below."
C. Foundation Distributions
Many individuals may decide that the disincentives to the creation
or funding of a family foundation are not significant enough for it to
discontinue its operations, and may finance their foundations through
cash contributions or depreciated securities in order to carry on some
charitable or like purpose of importance to the family. But for those
persons who are more concerned that their charity provide them with
a deduction than with the satisfaction of the philanthropy itself, the
reformation of the extent of the deductions to foundations is indeed
significant. Given, however, the understanding of a donor that he is
willing to do his foundation charity without much in the way of per-
sonal tax benefits, there is the additional consideration of the dispens-
ing of charity by the foundation.
sales or exchanges with their foundation; otherwise they are treated as self dealers and
subject to tax. The exception for sales of excess business holdings back to the family
by the foundation (Tax Reform Act, § 101(1)(2)(B)) applies only to holdings of the
foundation owned on May 26, 1969.
48 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4943(a) (1).
47 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4943(b).
48
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6684.
481 See P. 443 infra.
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Another new provision, section 4945,30 dealing with "taxable
expenditures," will have the effect of making most family foundations
mere conduits for contributions to publicly supported organizations.
This section imposes upon a foundation an initial tax of 10 percent of
the amount of the "taxable expenditure."al "Taxable expenditures"
include amounts which a foundation pays or incurs (1) to make a
grant to an individual for travel, study or similar purposes, or (2) to
make a grant to an organization other than an organization described
in § 509(a) (1), (2) or (3) (i.e., publicly supported organizations),
or (3) for any purpose other than an exempt purpose." If a founda-
tion makes a grant to an individual, it can avoid the tax by establish-
ing an objective and nondiscriminatory procedure, keeping appropriate
records and obtaining IRS approval.33
 For a grant to an orga-
nization that is not publicly supported, the foundation must exercise
"expenditure responsibility," a form of oversight over the grantee, and
make and file appropriate reports on each such grant." Even with the
exceptions, the general import for the smaller family foundation is that
there is incentive to channel the funds of the foundation only to estab-
lished, publicly-supported institutions.
Safety may become the most significant consideration in the grant
function unless foundation management is prepared to pay for legal
advice on new organizations, non-public exempt grantees or individual
grantees. For example, if a grant is made to a donee organization other
than one described in section 509(a) (1), (2) or (3)," necessitating
exercise of expenditure responsibility over the grant, the directors or
trustees of the foundation must exert reasonable efforts and establish
adequate procedures to see that the grant is spent solely for the
purpose for which it was made, must obtain full and complete reports
from the grantee on how the funds are spent, and finally must make full
and detailed reports with respect to such expenditures to the Internal
Revenue Service. It is likely that such responsibility is more than most
families will be willing to assume with respect to the conduct of the
affairs of the foundation, with the result that they will make their
55 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 4945.
51
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 4945(a)(1).
52
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 4945(d)(3),(g) (grants to individuals) and 5 4945(d)
(4),(h) (grants to organizations). Taxable expenditures also include amounts paid or
incurred in connection with voter registration drives (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 4945(d)
(2),(f) and legislative activity (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 4945(d) (1),(e)). As to the
limitations on foundation political activity, see Note, Political Activity and Tax
Exempt Organizations Before and After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 38 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1114 (1970). See also Lehrfeld, The Taxation of Ideology, 19 Cath. U. of Am.
L. Rev. 54 (1969).
53
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 4945(g). See also T.D. 7022, 35 Fed. Reg. 763 (1970).
54
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, II 4945(h).
55 See note 9 supra.
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distributions to more established institutions such as schools, churches
or hospitals, avoiding innovation or experimentation. It seems likely
that if the safest and most efficient means of carrying out private
foundation activities is to make expenditures to publicly-supported
charities, it will not take too long for the family to realize that this
can be done directly, thereby avoiding the intervening device of the
foundation, and avoiding certain limitations on contributions. Desir-
able of maintaining minimum exposure to this particular provision, and
recognizing the greater tax benefits accorded direct contributions to
public charities, the consequence of such realization will probably be
manifested by termination of the small foundation.
II. PHASE TWO—DONOR INVOLVEMENT
Self dealing is not of sufficient importance to justify
federal legislation; it is submitted that self regulation by
private foundations is the answer to this problem. 5°
Investigations by Representative Patman into the dealings of
foundations and their financial transactions with donors, friends of
donors, members of the family, etc., provided the necessary impetus
to the Treasury Department to analyze foundation activities and
suggest a bar on self-dealing transactions between particularly de-
scribed individuals and private foundations." Under Section 503 of
the Code," until its amendment, private foundations could not engage
in certain specified prohibited transactions. For the most part, how-
ever, arm's-length dealings with donors and family members could be
transacted without jeopardizing deductibility of contributions to the
foundation or its exempt status. If there was no real detriment or loss
to the foundation in these transactions, but the benefits flowing to the
donor or the family were rather substantial, the government sometimes
attempted to argue that the organization was not "exclusively"
operated for charitable or like purposes. Tax exempt status for various
family funds, however, was continued although assistance was fur-
nished needy relatives," old family servants," or employees of the
donor's corporation," or the donor himself was able to borrow back
some of his contributions." Given the problems of "fair dealing" and
55 Statement of Nat'l Assn. of Foundations, Inc., Written Statements By Interested
Individuals and Organizations on Treasury Report on Private Foundations, Submitted
to House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 412 (1965).
07 See note 11 supra.
58
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503.
59
 Otto T. Mallery, 40 B.T.A. 778 (1938), nonacq., 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 57.
00
 Havemeyer v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1938).
01
 Harnson v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1937).
62 Donald G. Griswold, 39 T.C. 620 (1962)), acq., 1965.1 Cum. Bull. 4.
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the weighing of the benefits conferred in relation to benefits granted,
tax exemption for the foundation and contribution deductions for the
donor were generally sustained."
One of the major problems of foundation use and abuse was that
the only penalty available to remedy the alleged abuse was directed at
the foundation for the year of the alleged abuse and, in addition, tied
possibly, but not necessarily, to disallowance of a contribution deduction
to the donor." Unless the abuse of the income or assets of the foundation
occurred in the same year as the year of a contribution, the family was
generally unaffected, and it is hard to justify any sanction which is not
imposed on the advantaged party to the transaction. The 1969 amend-
ments overcame these limitations of section 503 by shifting the focus of
the sanction and the scope of the proscribed activities. Section 4941"
removes private foundations from the operation of section 503 and
moves to prohibit self-dealing transactions by imposing an initial excise
tax at a 5 percent rate and an additional tax at a 200 percent rate on
the amount involved in the self-dealing transaction, on the self dealer
and, under certain circumstances, the foundation manager. Self dealers
are "disqualified persons,'"° which includes a substantial contributor
to the foundation, the foundation's management, and family members
of the foregoing (except for brothers and sisters). Persons who are
neither substantial contributors nor foundation managers may still be
regarded as disqualified persons if they have certain actual or benefi-
cial interests in a substantial contributor, for example, a corporation,
trust or partnership. There is, then, both upstream and downstream
attribution so as to taint corporations, partnerships, trusts or estates
substantially related to any of these persons. Attribution can operate
three, four or five times removed so as to treat an individual as a dis-
qualified person even though his relationship to the private foundation
is relatively remote. For example, if corporation A, equally owned by
three brothers, made a substantial contribution to a foundation, each
brother would be regarded as a disqualified person. The spouse of
each brother would likewise be regarded as a disqualified person along
with the children of such individuals. If a child of one of the owners
of corporation A owned corporation B, corporation B would also be
treated as a disqualified person in relation to the private foundation. If
corporation B happens to sell stationery to the foundation, it would
be liable for a tax on the value of the supplies sold to the foundation.
Most importantly, it would be liable for the tax notwithstanding its
lack of knowledge that it was a disqualified person in relation to the
as Id.
64 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 503(d) prior to amendment by 1969 Tax Reform Act.
63 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4941.
ss ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4946.
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foundation, or its lack of willfulness with respect to engaging in the
self-dealing transaction."
The transactions which are ,potentially taxable to a disqualified
person include the sale, exchange or leasing of properties between the
foundation and any disqualified person. This includes, for example, the
transfer of indebted real or personal property (by contribution) to a
private foundation where the disqualified person placed a mortgage or
similar lien on the property within ten years ending on the date of
transfer." The lending of money or other extension of credit between
a foundation and the disqualified person is a self-dealing transaction,
unless the money loaned to the foundation is without interest or other
charge, and the proceeds of the loan are used by the private foundation
exclusively for purposes described in section 501(c) (3). 80 The furnish-
ing of goods, services or facilities by a disqualified person is a self-
dealing transaction unless it is without charge to the foundation, and
the goods, services or facilities so furnished are used exclusively for
purposes described in section 501(c) (3). If goods, services or facilities
are furnished by a foundation to a disqualified person, they must be
furnished on a basis no more favorable than that available to any
member of the general public. Thus, a foundation can furnish an office
without charge to a foundation manager, but no better an office than
what would be furnished any individual holding the same position. A
corollary to this provision taxes compensation paid to disqualified
persons unless the amount of compensation is reasonable and the
services are necessary to carry out the exempt purpose of the founda-
tion." Finally, there is the catch-all provision which taxes a self dealer
where there has been a transfer to, or use of, by him or for his benefit,
any part of the income or corpus of the foundation. 71
The initial tax on the self dealer is 5 percent of the amount in-
volved with respect to the self-dealing transaction. The amount in-
volved represents the greater of the amount of money or fair market
value of the property given or received with respect to the self-dealing
transaction." The tax is imposed for each year in the taxable period in
which the transaction remains outstanding and uncorrected." Thus, if
the transaction continues over a period of years, the 5 percent tax is
imposed upon the self dealer on an annual basis until the transaction
is reversed. If the Internal Revenue Service discovers the transaction,
67
 The self-dealing tax will apply to "inadvertent" transactions, H.R. Rep, 91-413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969).
68 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4941(d)(2)(A).
60 hit. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4941(d)(1)(B).
70 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 494I(d)(1)(D), (d)(2)(E).
71 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4941(d)(1)(E).
72
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, I 4941(e)(2).
78 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, g 4941(a) (1), (e) (1).
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notifies the disqualified person of the existence of it, and demands the
correction of the transaction, the failure of the self dealer to correct
the transaction may lead to a tax equal to 200 percent of the amount
involved. In any case in which the transaction represents a repeated
type of transaction, or in a single case where the self dealing was
flagrant, a 100 percent penalty can be imposed with respect to the
initial tax, or the additional tax, or both. The effect of this, in the
aggregate, means that a member of the family which engages in a
transaction with a private foundation can end up paying to the federal
government more than four times the value of property or other items
involved in the self-dealing transaction.
Few people try to justify or condone self dealing in the crasser
sense where fair value is not given and received by the parties. How-
ever, some persons may feel that dealing with their foundation should
not be a hazardous avocation, since many benefits may accrue to the
foundation, and ultimately all charity, through various transactions
between a family and its foundation." But the provision was not meant
to preserve the baby and throw out the bath water. Its purpose was
single and complete: ban all self dealing by personally taxing those
individuals involved so that no measure need be made by administra-
tors to determine or quantify the benefits conferred or burdens sus-
tained. Thus, by disregarding the balancing process, shifting the
sanction to the individuals involved, and having the sanction apply
absolutely, regardless of knowledge, negligence, willfulness or the like,
the family or other disqualified persons of the foundation would
channel their investment and other opportunities elsewhere to the
long-term benefit of public philanthrophy.
III. PHASE THREE—ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING
[To require a public foundation report] will restrain a staff
of a foundation that might be a little overanxious to do
things because they know that what they are going to do will
have to be disclosed. By that I do not mean doing things
in the sense of something dishonest, but I mean in the way
of extreme social action of some kind."
Every family foundation must have a board of directors or
trustees and officers who take the responsibility for determining the
size, shape and locus of grants, writing out the checks, filing the annual
report with the state, maintaining the books and records on grants, and
otherwise acting as a form of "management." At the present time, these
management officials may act rather discontinuously with little, if any,
74 Senate Tax Reform Hearings at 5499-511.
is 113 Cong. Rec. S 15647 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1969) (remarks of Senator Curtis).
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formalities observed, even for a part-time paid staff. However, founda-
tion managers acting in such haphazard fashion are the potential
targets of several of the taxes prescribed in Chapter 42. This means
that the failure to devote full time and attention to the responsibilities
of managing a private foundation may cost a director, trustee, officer,
employee, or other person his own, money. Initially, a foundation
manager is liable for 2-Y2 percent tax on the amount involved in a
self-dealing transaction if he knew he was engaging in a self-dealing
act and did so willfully and without . reasonable cause." In addition,
if there is a refusal on his part to agree to correction of all or part of
the self-dealing transactions, the manager could be subject to an
additional tax of 50 percent of the amount involved, subject to a
$10,000 limit as to either tax." In the investment area, a manager who
knowingly participated in the investment of income or assets of the
foundation in a manner which jeopardized its ability, through specula-
tive trading, to carry out its exempt function, could be taxed at the
rate of 5 percent of the amount so invested if he did so willfully and
without reasonable cause." Failure to correct the hazardous invest-
ment renders the manager liable for a 5 percent additional tax on the
amount involved, subject again to a $5,000 maximum for the initial
tax and a $10,000 maximum for the additional tax." Finally, in the
case of a foundation manager who agreed to make any "taxable
expenditure," 8° he is liable for 2-Y2 percent tax on the amount involved
unless his agreement was not willful and due to reasonable cause."
This means, for example, that if the foundation manager fails to exer-
cise expenditure responsibility over a grant to another private founda-
tion, he may be taxed personally at the rate of 2- 1/2 percent of the
amount of the grant. If foundation management refused to agree to
all or part of the correction of the taxable expenditure, it could be
liable for a tax of 50 percent of the amount of taxable expenditure, up
to the $5,000 and $10,000 Iimits. 82
Who among the family is willing to risk this hazardous duty
merely to satisfy some other family member's desires for personal
philanthropy? To any other individual, even a lawyer or accountant
aware of his Chapter 42 exposure to the substantive provisions, the
mere existence of such exposure may be enough to render that person
unavailable for a management position. There is no particular appeal
76 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4941(c)(2).
77 Int. Rev, Code of 1954, § 4941(b)(2), (c)(2).
78 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4944(a) (2).
79 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4944(b)(2), (d)(2).
so Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4945(d)(2).
61 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, * 4945 (a) (2 )
82 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4945(b)(2), (c)(2).
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to being a non-professional foundation manager, since one would not
be able to devote full time and attention to the foundation and assure
non-liability as to his management of its affairs. Part-time foundation
managers would also be discouraged when reckoning with new record-
keeping and reporting responsibilities which attend the administration
of foundation affairs, since there are personal penalties, both civil and
criminal, for failure to carry out these duties. 88
Complaints about foundation secrecy as to income, assets, grants,
salaries, and the like were rectified by provisions in the Tax Reform
Act which require additional administrative responsibilities." Pre-
viously, a foundation was only required to file with the Internal
Revenue Service an exempt organizational information return." An
annual report is now required of every private foundation, in addition
to the information return which had at least $5,000 in assets at any
time during the year. What is important about the annual report is
that among the responsibilities which attend its preparation and sub-
mission to the Internal Revenue Service, the foundation must place a
notice of availability of the annual report in a newspaper having cir-
culation in the county in which the foundation's principal office is
located. The notice must state the address of the foundation's principal
office, the name of its principal manager, and the fact that the report
is available for inspection during the regular business hours by any
citizen who requests it." This means, for example, that the business-
man who keeps the foundation's books and records in his home must
open up his home to any citizen who desires to inspect the records of
88 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 4944(a)(2), 4945(a)(2), (b)(2), 6685.
84
 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6033(b), 6055(b), the accounting and other
responsibilities which now attend foundation management require information on total
contributions and gifts received during the year; the names and addresses of all sub-
stantial contributors; the gross income of the foundation for the year; the expenses
attributable to such gross income which were incurred within the year; the disburse-
ment (including administrative expenses) paid or incurred within the year; disburse-
ments within the year for purposes for which the foundation maintains its exempt
status; an itemized list of all grants made or approved for future payment during the
year showing the amount of each grant, the name and address of the recipient, and the
relationship between any individual recipient and the foundation, managers or substan-
tial contributors, and a record of the purpose for each grant; financial information in
the nature of a balance sheet showing assets, liabilities and net worth; an itemized
statement of the foundation's securities and all other assets as of the close of the year,
with information on both the book and market value; the names and addresses of all
the foundation managers; the names and addresses of highly compensated employees;
the compensation and other payments (e.g., expense accounts) made during the year
to each foundation manager; the compensation and other payments made during the
year to highly compensated employees; the address of the principal office of the
foundation and, if different, the place where its books and records are maintained; and
finally, the information regarding transactions which fall within the ambit of Ch. 42 of
the Code.
85
 IRS Form 990-A.
88
 113 Cong. Rec. 15646-5647 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1969).
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the foundation. Failure to maintain or make available these records
renders the manager liable for personal penalties."
A private foundation manager is also liable for personal penalties
for failure to file either a timely or a complete annual report with
respect to the information required. The annual report penalties are
imposed upon the foundation manager or other person (possibly in-
cluding an outside accountant or attorney) who is under a duty to
perform the act in respect of which a violation occurs. 88
 Failure to file,
through either negligence or willfulness, a timely annual report, as con-
trasted with a timely information return, may render the foundation
manager liable for a $10 a day penalty (subject to a $5,000 maximum)
unless reasonable cause was shown for such failure. No advance notice
to management as to its failures is required of the Internal Revenue
Service before the assessment of the penalty is made. 8° For the
foundation manager who willfully fails to file a timely annual report,
willfully fails to publish notice of the availability of the timely report
in a newspaper, or willfully fails to comply with the public inspection
requirements, there is the prospect of a $1,000 fine with respect to
each such failure. 8° Finally, if a foundation manager who is required
to furnish the information on foundation activities willfully furnishes
fraudulent information to the Internal Revenue Service, the manager
is subject to a $1,000 fine or one year' in prison or both." As a conse-
quence, the maintenance, availability and correctness of books and
records is singularly important.
No longer may it be assumed that the management of a small
foundation (except one below $5,000 in assets) may be carried on in
haphazard fashion. The obligations for administration and record-
keeping, timely filing and overseeing of the investment, charitable
and housekeeping functions require the family and the manager to
pay closer attention to foundation affairs than to their personal affairs.
If the wife can't balance her checkbook or forgets to write down certain
checks for personal bills, there is no problem. If, however, that syn-
drome is carried over to the family foundation, the results could be
disastrous.
CONCLUSION
To a donor unconcerned with the tax considerations, or at least
willing to accept the disincentives to foundation giving, the private
87
 hit. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6685, provides for a $1,000 fine for each willful failure
to file the report or to fan to comply with the publicity requirements of § 6104(d).
88
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6652(d)(3).
89 Id, Under § 6652(d)(2) notice is required for assessment of the penalty in the
case of late filing of an organization's Information return.
90 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6685.
91 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7207.
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foundation may represent an appropriate, but unlikely, vehicle for the
personal touch in philanthropy. Assuming his managers, not neces-
sarily including himself, are well versed in the tax law and are good
record keepers, his foundation can .concentrate on areas of direct and
immediate charitable consequence relevant to the donor's personal
ideology or philanthropic goals. But with the new law, the exploration
of social or economic actions by funding studies or direct action groups
will be severely constricted. The Treasury Department Report on
Private Foundations portrayed the pre-Tax Reform Act role of foun-
dations in these terms:
Private philanthropy plays a special and vital role in our
society. Beyond providing for areas into which government
cannot or should not advance (such as religion), private
philanthropic organizations can be uniquely qualified to in-
itiate thought and action, experiment with new and untried
ventures, dissent from prevailing attitudes, and act quickly
and flexibly.
Private foundations have an important part in this work
available even to those of relatively restricted means, they
enable individuals or small groups to establish these char-
itable endeavors and to express their own bents, concerns ;
and experience. In so doing, they enrich the pluralism of our
social order. Equally important, because their funds are
frequently free of commitment to specific operating pro-
grams, they can shift the focus of their interests and their
financial support from one charitable area to another. They
can, hence, constitute a powerful instrument for evolution,
growth and improvement in the shape and direction of
charity.g2
It is submitted that this is no longer the case for the threat of sanc-
tion is, and will be, as devitalizing an act as the actual application
of any tax upon a foundation. The true toll of the foundation pro-
visions will not be in the amount of Chapter 42 taxes collected, but
rather in the unmade grants for unusual or experimental educational,
charitable and scientific projects.
In sum, the personal and organizational risks which today inhere
in the operation of a private foundation are substantial. The dis-
incentives to creation and funding of a new foundation are enormous,
92
 Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations, Senate Comm. on Finance
(1965).
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and the advantages to be gained over public philanthropy have dis-
appeared. Indeed, the lawyer who creates a "Mom and Dad" or small
family foundation in this climate displays the same kind of judgment
he had when he bought his second Edsel.
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